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Object or detail 
In his book the Lost Language of Symbolism (1912), Harold Bayley draws attention to the initial use and 
mystical significance of watermarks. These strange esoteric designs somehow inserted into the very fabric of 
paper, vaguely visible when held to light, constitute an uncharted (almost hidden) history of religious 
epistolary forms. From the thirteenth century (the earliest record dates from 1282) watermarks, paper-marks, 
or ‘thought fossils’ were used to carry out secret messages between members of heretical sects such as 
Cathari, Templars, Rosicrucians or pre-reformation Protestants. Even after they were notionally exterminated 
under the edicts of the thirteenth century papacy, Cathari watermarks continued to be used as a virtually 
undetectable or indecipherable form of communication (the mystical guild of paper-crafting was a stock trade 
of the Cathari). 
 
Some of these Gnostic symbols are now obvious and easy to decrypt; pictograms of the initials ‘RM’ signified 
the rex mundi (an epithet peculiar to the Rosicrucian God); an unicorn munching a fleur de lys emblematised 
the moral purity of puritan sects such as cathari; the fleur de lys on its own represented the trinity, or christ of 
light (lys = lux); a dolphin signified the province of Dauphiney, headquarters of the Vaudois (one of the 
French heretic puritan sects). Some of these symbols represent the founding political values of the sects; 
invectives and allegories denouncing the hierarchy of the Papacy and the Catholic Church wewre encrypted in 
a variety of pictograms and ideograms. Other symbols continue to baffle and remain indecipherable.  
 
Bayley’s amateur, yet nevertheless, majestic disquisition into printer’s marks and paper marks looks far 
removed from, and irrelevant to, the current use of watermarks predominantly as notice of copyright. Far from 
propagating a secret code within an image or text – a code that can be interpreted only by the few - modern 
watermarks are designed to put the whole world on notice (although data contained in some digital 
watermarks can be used used in steganography to communicate secret messages between parties). Take as an 
initial example, the corporate logos used by television companies (ITV, Sky, TFI etc) that are digitally 
embedded on their programmes. These logos both advertise that company and warn the total viewing public 
of ownership. Moreover, since it is impossible to remove these embedded images without destroying overall 
picture quality, these digitized watermarks aid detection of any unauthorised recording or broadcasting of 
those programmes (for example, on youtube). Modern copyright practice places more than a modicum of faith 
in watermarks as proof of ownership and authenticity. Difficult to erase, and at one with the very texture of 
the copyrightable object, they are a hyper-efficient means of providing notice of ownership and authenticity. 
Watermarks represent an identity with an accuracy rooted in the idea of a permanently stable descriptive 
medium. They hold within themselves the potential to tell an objective truth in a clear and non-erasable 
manner. Their efficacy rests on theoretical qualities that will be analysed in resolutely modern terms of 
Cartesian concepts of representative stability, clarity, technologically mediated eradication of doubt and 
objectivity. 
 
The prolific use of modern forms of watermarking bears little resemblance to the esoteric objects of Bayley’s 
inquiry. Indeed, from a modern perspective, Bayley’s work might be regarded as essential reading only for 
students of the secret traditions of Symbolic theology and Gnostic mysticism for whom the history of heresy is 
conspicuous and for whom the search for some key is crucial to unlocking the hidden wisdom, the noble 
savoir, of cosmic ordination.2 No such key to cosmic understanding would seem to pervade the utilitarian 
codes of copyright regulation (needless to say perhaps, neither will such a key be found in this short essay). 
Nevertheless, the claim pursued here is that something of the mystical paper-maker’s signature (‘paper-
maker’s tears’ as they are sometimes called), his iconoclastic spirit, interrupts the manner in which a 
                                                 
1 School of law, Birkbeck college, University of London, WC1E 7HX. p.haldar@bbk.ac.uk 
2 See, for example, Frater Nedia ‘Bacon’s Advancement Of Learning’ in American Rosae Crucis Magazine 
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viewer/reader approaches a piece of work as a whole. This becomes particularly evident if the watermark is 
considered to be a particular detail of an overall image, recording or text. To be sure, the legal-ontological 
status of the watermark is contestable and caught between two different tropes. At one level, watermarks are 
objects in their own right. On another, they are mere supplementary details. While important as copyright 
notices, they are inessential to the overall appreciation of a piece of work. From this latter perspective, the use 
of watermarking as a feature of modern copyright regulations disrupts the very manner in which we view an 
epistemic object of inquiry. What is at stake is the manner in which copyright notices effect and control the 
subject’s capacity of sight. 
 
Put differently, reliance on Cartesian concepts misconstrues and underrates the empirical visual encounter 
with the copyrighted and watermarked object. Following a brief analysis of the Cartesian assumptions that 
support the use of watermarks, this paper will then focus on the watermark as a particular detail embedded in 
the work. This detail demands of the viewing/reading subject a particular form of sight that does not sit easily 
with the assumed subject of Cartesian philosophy. In this sense, a watermarked image/text is rather 
anatomised into its constituent parts, a process of filleting the very material of an image or document has to 
take place. In order to acquire meaning (and not simply in terms of ownership), it shall be argued, images 
have to be torn apart and rendered unstable. A form of iconoclasm is enacted under examination according to 
which images are defaced and destroyed in a manner that seems to contradict the modern judicial faith in 
images. One might argue that the mystical roots of watermarking and papercrafting operate as a subliminal 
reminder of more hieratically and mythically charged ways of viewing. Watermarks alert us to an 
underground or fallen tradition of sight initiated by details, supplements and accidents.  
 
Epistemological assumptions 
For the purposes of this argument, it is important to summarise the justifications for the use of watermarks 
according to broader theoretical and philosophical assumptions. What seems to emerge, perhaps surprisingly 
for an empirically minded institution such as the common law, is a model of imagistic and visual 
representation that is based on certain key traits of Cartesian modernity. These traits are best discerned when 
considered from the doctrinal perspective of evidence law and the use of Watermarks as proof of intellectual 
property rights and copyright infringement (indeed digital watermarking might be described as an ideal 
evidentiary form. Public-key cryptography, for example, is used in order to keep track of evidential images 
placed in Police custody pending a criminal trial thereby ensuring that these images do not leak out into the 
public domain).3 Legal questions regarding the admissibility and use of watermarks in the trial would raise 
few difficulties. Since 1997, when Playboy properly used watermarks in establishing ownership of 
copyrighted images, digital watermarks have attained prolific and highly probative force in trials between 
internet websites.4  
 
The primary concern for the courts is to establish the image as ‘real’ evidence thereby distinguishing them 
from hearsay documents. The status of ‘real’ evidence attaches to objects that the law defines simply in terms 
of their tangibility. Physical materials implicated in a case might be examined during trial as mere objects that 
directly testify to some fact in issue. The possibility that an item of real evidence might be fabricated by one or 
other of the parties is one that might be eradicated or confirmed during the trial itself. Where its provenance is 
questionable, an evidential image such as a watermark, will be tendered for inspection, examination and cross-
examination with supplementary proof of authenticity.  
 
This might seem peculiar since watermarks might be considered to be hearsay statements par excellence. 
Watermarks are ‘tongues of an unseen world.’ The original statements regarding identity were made out of 
                                                 
3 See Wen-Chao Yang, Che-Yen Wen and Chung-Hao Chen, ‘Applying Public-Key Watermarking 
Techniques in Forensic Imaging to Preserve the Authenticity of Evidence’ in Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science Vol. 5075 (2008). 
4 Playboy v. Webbworld (1997) 968 F.Spp 1171 N.D. Tex. 
court.5 The old common law rules against the admissibility of hearsay stressed the dangers that such 
material might be unreliable or even manufactured.6 Nevertheless, watermarks overcome the usual 
suspicions levelled against hearsay statements since they are the result of mechanical or technological 
reproduction. Technology guarantees reliability to the extent that they might be regarded as direct and real 
media. (in traditional paper processes, the watermark image is produced by using wire, bent into shape, to 
vary the thickness and opacity of the paper. During this stamping process the paper is only slightly wet). 
Technology renders watermarks more reliable, more incontestable than any other form of copyright notice. 
 
Given that computer images are more easily manipulated, it might be supposed that the digital revolution 
ushers in stronger doubts about the reliability and manufacture of the watermarks. The evidential problems 
posed by digital formatting have been the subject of the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology.7 While recognising the ease with which digital images might be copied and modified, the 
committee concluded that evidential benefits conferred by them far outweigh any concerns over 
authenticity. Moreover, the technological forms of encryption render the very analysis of the digital data of 
which a watermark is composed highly complicated (though not impossible); “it is possible to hide the 
watermark within the image data with a form of encryption…the watermark can be viewed only with the 
appropriate decryption key.”8 Compliance with relevant industry standards ensure that a modified image is 
easily detected. The never-ending discovery of new forms of protection technology thus provides further 
even guarantees of accuracy.  
 
Technology establishes the watermark upon, or within, a surface with immediacy through a mechanical, 
chemical or digital process. Impressions or imprints, the appropriate analogy might be the divine print upon 
the wax-like souls of Christian subjects. To borrow a term from Patristic theology, watermarks might be 
regarded as acheiropoetic. That is, it would be free of any mortal intervention, borne of non-human process, 
the product of pure scientific provenance. That is to say that such processes are ideally mint and free of human 
contact and intervention. At this level of analysis, it is assumed that technology guarantees a causal link 
between, (or, even an immanent fixing of) the object, ownership and proof. Indeed, digital processes attempt 
to further minimise the distinction between object and proof. This non-spatial differentiation between a thing 
and confirmation of its ownership leaves little room for doubt. It is through technology, that evidence attempts 
to bridge the gap between high probability and absolute certainty that characterises modern epistemology.  
 
Again, a certain Cartesianism is inherent in this reliance upon the mimetic processes attributed to image 
technology. The Cartesian method of proof, of course, begins with the process of eradicating doubt. The 
‘truth’ of a matter arises once we are left with clear and distinct ideas.9 Technology transforms an object of 
knowledge that is otherwise prone to the defects of probable knowledge into a clearer and more distinct 
representation as free from doubt as one can achieve in our limited sphere of moral certainty. In attaining what 
                                                 
5 The definition of hearsay is usually given as ‘an out of court statement (oral or otherwise) made by a 
person and tendered to prove the truth of its contents.’ See Wright v Tatham 7 Ad. & EL. 313. 
6 The old common law rules have now been superceded by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which attempts 
both to liberalise and codify rules regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal trials. 
7 House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Tecnology: Fifth Report (Digital Images as Evidence) 
1998, available at www.parliament.the-stationery –office.co.uk/pa/ld199798/ldsctech/064v/st0501.htm. On 
the benefits of digital imagery for broader schemes such as the National Identuty Register see the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (Project Iris Review) 2005: 
www.parliament.uk/parilamentary_committees/ science_and_technology_committee/scietecfuidcard.cfm 
8 Cap iii. HL Select Committee 
9 The relevance to evidential reasoning of the Cartesian method of doubt is expressed by Lord Brandon in 
Rhesa Shipping S.A v. Edmunds 1985 1 WLR. For a fuller account of the influence of Cartesian methods of 
doubt on the common law evidence, see John D. Jackson ‘Theories of Truth Finding in Criminal 
Procedure: An Evolutionary Approach’ 1 Cardozo Law Review vol. 10, n. 3, 1988pp. 514-529. There is 
clearly a contradiction between doubt as the first principle of this methodology and the doctrinal 
presumption of innocence. However, the limits of the present paper are such as to prevent further analysis 
of this point. 
is considered to be a high degree of probative force, the watermark as proof-object achieves a paradigmatic 
and privileged status among all other forms of testimony.  
 
Finally, the doctrinal assumptions regarding the evidential use and value of images obey a certain consistency 
with modern philosophical principles that privileges ocular sensation. The watermark is an object, an item, 
and, like any item, a residue of light which has to be seen (even if the perceptual capacity of human sight is 
technologically or digitally augmented). Indeed, it might be added that watermarks are an object in their own 
right, independent of the object that they claim to prove. They have their own protected status. Articles 11 
and 12 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, for example, prohibits the removal of digital signatures under 
international law. The case of Gregson v Vilana Financial Inc., a case involving the copying of images 
from websites, states that the removal of digital watermarks is proof of copyright infringement. It also 
states that the watermark itself is an actionable copyright.10 A copyright protected copyright. What 
evidence law does is to separate what was conjoined through technology, namely the thing and its proof. In 
so doing, it sets up a relationship between viewing subject and object based on visual discernability. 
 
It may well be, as Charles Goodwin has argued, that the standard of visible perception is professional, 
selective and perspectival (and, therefore far from being value free or neutral).11 It may well be that any image 
can only be apprehended having been first mediated by adversarial techniques. Nevertheless, by whatever 
means it is transformed into an object of legal knowledge, the image enters the trial arena as an object to be 
looked at and scrutinized. As a visible object in its own right, the watermark takes its place alongside all other 
visual items of real evidence such images, photofits, video recordings etc. They all exemplify what is at stake 
across the whole of evidential practice. The court is raised to the level of a Cartesian ego affirmo whereby 
distance is placed between perceiving subject and the referent; it distinguishes between subject and material 
object. It renders the first active and transcendental, the second inert. It privileges the subject over any 
referent/object as a disinterested, disengaged viewing machine living entirely outside the world it feels able to 
objectify. What is established is a position for the subject, the court, the judge, the jury within a symbolic and 
ordered register. That is to say, that even as a medium of description the image retains a specular function 
according to which subjectivity is positioned and affirmed in relation to the objectifiable world.  
 
Detail  
As an item of proof, the watermark emphasises certain qualities that are assumed to be inherent to its 
constitution. But the question of proof translates the watermark from mere detail to object in its own right. 
One of the purposes of the economical watermark is to authenticate a larger object of which the watermark is 
but a part. The theoretical question that arises is whether the watermark is an object within an object (as might 
be suggested by the case of Gregson v. Vilana) or a supplementary and adjectival detail. Because they cannot 
disrupt clarity, because they cannot obstruct the overall image, watermarks have to be discrete physical or 
visual traces. In digital processes, the objective is to place the watermark in the ‘least significant bit’ of the 
image (known by computer scientists as the LSB!).12  The scrutiny of details within an image contradicts the 
Cartesian and scientific pursuit of objective representation. It also subverts the Cartesian position of the active 
subject who supervises over a world of objects. That the image or text is assumed to be a clear and stable 
representation, that it minimises doubt, rests on the presupposition that it is clear of obfuscatory detail; “only 
the things I conceive clearly and distinctly have the power to convince me completely.”13  
 
                                                 
10 Gregerson v Vilana Financial Inc., 2006 WL 3227762 D.Minn. In fact, the thirteenth century jurist 
Bartola de Sassoferrato had already stated that ownership by individual papermakers could vest in 
watermarks. 
11 Charles Goodwin, ‘Professional Vision’ in American Anthropologist vol. 96 n. 3 1994, pp. 606-633. 
12 See Wen-Chao Yang, Che-Yen Wen and Chung-Hao Chen, ‘Applying Public-Key Watermarking 
Techniques in Forensic Imaging to Preserve the Authenticity of Evidence’ op. cit. 
13 Rene Descartes, ‘Fifth Meditation’ in Discourse on Method and Meditations (Harmondsworth: Pengiun, 
1985) at p 147.  
In a recent article, Ravit Reichman14 highlights the manner in which the more general aims of judicial 
methodology attempt to sacrifice trifles, small irrelevant details, and superfluous elements in favour of clearer 
scientific methods based on clarity and prediction. Details, argues Reichman, have little to do with the 
administration of justice and clear headed decisionism. We might note that Reichman’s focus on the inter-
relationship between law and culture (specifically the detective story as a cultural mediation of law) allows an 
alternative analysis of legal knowledge to emerge. Here, she argues that the cultural and literary analysis of 
law that develops outside the courtroom by way of detective and mystery novels allow for smaller details to 
rise to the surface. Broader cultural affection for the details that beset the investigative process is one that 
explains and allows for a ‘cultural pleasure’ in law as an antidote to dry legalism. 15 It is in fine detail rather 
than fine print that the reader of detective fiction achieves textual delights. 
 
The same argument regarding the sacrifice of detail might be made of the judicial and evidential evaluation of 
the watermarked image. In attempting to minimise the measure of doubt inherent in all probabilistic 
reasoning, evidence, after all, depends upon perspicuity and clarity. What renders the evidential image such a 
stable and technologically reliable medium is its supposed or relative freedom from obfuscation and 
undecidability. But are such “smaller details overlooked (or explicitly cast off) by legal discourse,” as 
Reichman would have it.16 The etymological roots of that betray the ocular, visual register of evidence 
(evidere) simultaneously alerts us to another pattern of enquiry that cannot easily be reconciled to the 
Cartesian epistemology that requires the sacrifice of detail in order to achieve clarity in order to judge 
authenticity. Videre/visio also lends its meaning to another mode of evidential inquiry based on division 
(dividere/divisio).17 To divide and individuate is to distinguish, to see things in detail, to forget the whole 
picture or object and to concentrate on the part. Is such a process of particularization not already prevalent 
within the way in which watermarks become visible? Independent of judicial pronouncements regarding the 
quality of the image as a form, is the court itself not already an anti-Cartesian forum? Does it not already 
participate in a long tradition that recognises the epistemological effects of encounters with details?  
 
Indeed, the watermark is an exemplary detail that marks and stains all legal reception of images and text. A 
photograph taken of a car crash might be scrutinized not for its overall depiction of the crash but for the 
manner in which the metal has twisted thereby providing a clue as to the causes of the crash, the speed with 
which the car was travelling (perhaps as it enters a tunnel) or the force of its impact. A photograph of an 
assassinated president might be examined in microscopic detail in order to assess the ballistic path of the fatal 
bullet. To provide a further example, consider the manner in which the video footage was used in the first trial 
of the police officers accused of using excessive force in the beating up of Rodney King. Instead of playing 
the video in actual time, defence lawyers were able to dissect its representative qualities with the most detailed 
precision. Images were frozen, aspects of a frozen image were encircled and isolated and through such 
techniques it became possible to conclude that Rodney King’s body was a threatening one. Rather than 
viewed as one whole event unfolding in time, the video image was atomised into infinitesimal movements of a 
leg muscle, a rising buttock, an angle of a foot. As one commentator puts it: “In actual time, King’s movement 
from the ground was closely linked to the blows of the batons and the jolts of the taser, but slow motion and a 
frozen video produced a different reality.”18  
 
Such an observation about the image is already recognition that the image contains within it atomic details, 
particles, that might otherwise be overlooked. The court is asked to hone in on one specific element that might 
make sense of the whole. The value of the image rests upon suspending normal everyday vision in order to 
                                                 
14 Ravit Reichman ‘Making a Mess of Things: The Trifles of Legal Pleasure’ in Law, Culture and the 
Humanities  1: 2005, pp. 14-34. 
15 Ravit Reichman, ‘Making a Mess of Things” at p 16. 
16 Ravit Reichman, ‘Making a Mess of Things” at p 16. 
17 Thomas Thomas, Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicane (Cantebridgiae: T.Thomasii) 1587.  
18 John Fiske, ‘Admissible Postmodernity: Some Remarks on Rodney King, O.J. Simpson, and 
Contemporary Culture’ in University of San Fransisco Law Review vol. 30, n. 4, pp 917-931 at p 918. 
give attention to certain, otherwise hidden, elements. Cartesian methodology assumes the viewer of the image 
to be in control. The effect of the watermark, suggests otherwise that it is rather the image itself that 
surrenders its hidden code and renders details visible.  
 
Take, from the more general evidential category, the case of photofit images as a further example of what 
Reichman usefully terms ‘detailism’. New computer based wizardry has now established systems in which an 
image can be ‘evolved’ on screen following statements made by witnesses. Using genetic algorithms, the 
computer begins with a data base of thousands of variations of facial features; eyes, noses, chins, hair types 
and styles etc. In addition to these principle components, software is able to add skin tone, wrinkles, blemishes 
and so on. Once a possible solution is provided, the computer then repeatedly evolves the image until it best 
satisfies the witnesses recollection. The final face can then be dismantled into its constituent parts so that a 
new nose, or new chin can be added to the data base in order to be used in the future.19 Both the systematic 
compilation of the photofit and the process of identification relies not on an overall interpretation of identity, 
but rather on subordinate, even pedestrian, features. Far from sublimating the centrality of details, the photofit 
demands an appreciation of a seemingly endless proliferation of constituent parts that make up a face. The 
overall coherence of identity rests upon recalcitrant details that can never be exhaustively or totally archived. 
 
Such a practice of detailism is one that already has a long history in evidential practice of the courts. It focuses 
upon the minimal signatures, the minutiae and seemingly insignificant detail. In attending to the visual nature 
of micro details that informs evidence, it could be argued that all evidence is imagistic in nature.20 
Historically, what saves a document from the status of hearsay are excessive visual minutiae that adhere to the 
surface of a document. They are what convert an otherwise anonymous letter into an onymous text. Such 
details - notorial signs, flourished pen work, initials, obligatory latin mottos, wafer seals and watermarks – are 
not essential to the document; they do not spell out any meaning.21 They are, however, the condition of its 
reception. Seals, for instance, (which may contain the impression of a fingernail, a garment, or a heraldic 
insignia) are both safeguards against interference and a the very token by which an agreement or instruction 
can be said to have taken place. They both close and complete a document and grant it a meaning by placing it 
within a recognisable symbolic register.  
 
The place of ‘detailism’ can be expanded further in order to state that the oral witness himself can be 
understood in more imagistic terms. In his defence of the oral tradition of the common law, Matthew Hale 
turns the witness into an imagistic being composed of visual indicia; indeed it is the non-conscious 
mannerisms of a witness that supports his argument: “Many times the very manner of a witness delivering 
testimony will give an indication whether he speaks truly or falsely.”22 What matters in the ascertainment of 
the truth value of a witness statement rests upon those visual indicia that leak out of the bodies of even the 
most schooled of witnesses. Indeed, rather than focus on the idea of the living pneumatic voice, it is precisely 
these visual details that form the consilia on oral testimony by the fourteenth century jurist Baldus: “we blush 
to say many things which we do not blush to write...One must see in a witness with what trembling he speaks, 
what there is in the visage, if he hesitates....there is a popular adage which says, speak and I will recognise 
                                                 
19 New Scientist 19 March 2005 available at www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7143. 
20 Or, as one judge puts it; “Every object seen with the natural eye is onle seen because photographed on 
the retina…What we call sight is but the impression made on the mind through the retina of the eye, which 
is nature’s camera.” William Eborn v. George B. Zimpleman, Adm’r & c., 47 Texas 503 (1877) cited in Joel 
Snyder, ‘Res Ipsa Loquitor’ at p 219. 
21 That signatures, wax seals, stamped leather fixes the identity of the witness is treated more historical 
fashion by Jean-Phillipe Levy, La Hierarchie des Preuves dans le Droit Savant du Moyen Ages (Paris: 
Annales de L’universite de Lyon, 1939). A more philosophical treatment of the status of the signature as a 
mark of transcendental presence (or nowness) is of course famously provided by Jacques Derrida, 
‘Signature, Event, Context’, in Margins of Philosophy, tr. Alan Bass (London; Harvester Weatsheaf, 1982) 
at p 328. 
22 Sir Matthew Hale, History of the Common Law of England (Chicago:University of Chicago Press), 1975 
you.”23 Or, as in the context of the modern doctrine of ‘real’ evidence: “The blush of nervousness or 
occasionally shame, the gape of stupidity, the gesture of annoyance, all have evidentiary value”24 In short, 
what applies to watermarks extends to an analysis of all proof objects.  
 
To what extent might this practice of detailism provide a radical alternative understanding of the place of 
copyright notices? To what extent might does it render relevant Bayley’s history of mystical marks of 
communication? One of the charges that might be levelled against detailism is that it does not necessarily 
subvert the Cartesian distinction between subject and object. Details require that a subject confronts them in 
an act of supervision. The Aristotelian process of reasoning, after all, rests on the fundamental proposition that 
details and particularities are inherent entities to an object. It has already been noted that legal doctrine renders 
watermarks a quantifiable object. Even if only in philosophical, empirical or non-doctrinal terms, the same is 
true of all images. The imagistic detail is simply one further, albeit smaller object contained within a larger 
object (a photograph or video). A portion of an object remains an object to be viewed; the frozen and 
highlighted image of Rodney King’s foot is still a foot and might be treated as an objective fact in its own 
isolated terms. The point is made by the art historian, Georges Didi-Huberman.25 For him, the detail is a 
nameable element of a painting. Details are all too visible; threads, needles, pins etc (in his analysis of 
Vermeer’s The Lacemaker). However miniscule, such details are merely hidden among other details waiting 
to be discovered by the “skilled art theorist’ who wishes to behave like a fetishist.”26  
 
Nevertheless, an important albeit unintended point seems to arise from Didi-Huberman’s observation. For, 
what a skilled art theorist who behaves like a fetishist (Didi-Huberman’s terms) actually does is to apply a fine 
scalpel to a philosophical tradition that seeks to repress the radicality of details by denying a distinction 
between substance and detail, or between the whole and the part. Indeed to render the detail an objectifiable 
element of a whole surrenders to a Cartesian fusion between substance and detail (or accident).27 Nothing 
about the evidential practice of honing in on details allows for such a collapsing of a distinction between the 
whole and its part. These two features (the skilled art theorist who behaves like a fetishist, and the relationship 
between detail and substance) can be looked at in more depth in order to discern a more radical interpretation 
of the relationship between watermark and text..  
 
In fact another tract of inquiry opens up if we were to ask more profoundly what the forensic examination of 
the watermark requires if conducted in the manner of a fetishist or a connoisseur. It is somewhat interesting 
and fortuitous to note that watermarks are the subject of connoisseurship. Bayley’s The Lost Language of 
Symbolism is simply one of many texts that collect and fetish the watermark. However, the term 
‘connoisseur’, as the art historian Edgar Wind reminds us, should not be used simply to name a collector or 
character of refined taste.28 Such a designation was an Eighteenth century import into the English language. 
Rather, the term is to be understood as an alternative cognoscitorem to describe one who is skilled in the 
evidential practice of attribution. Connoisseurship designates the practice by which the correct ownership can 
be attached to a piece of work, or by which a painter’s name can be attached to an otherwise anonymous (or 
falsly onymous) picture with precision; “as a skilled technician, the modern connoisseur knows by what signs 
to distinguish the genuine from the counterfeit; he can demonstrate authenticity.”29 Such skills, according to 
Wind, are based upon a rationalized set of techniques and methods defined initially by Giovanni Morelli. This 
Morellian procedure, as it has become known, rests on “a meticulous technique of visual dissociation.”30 This 
technique avoids the mistake-ridden business of inspecting an overall picture for its themes and subjects of 
                                                 
23 Baldus, cited in G.D. Nokes, ‘Real Evidence’ 65 Law Quarterly Review 1949 at p 62. 
24 G.D. Nokes ‘Real Evidence’ p67. 
25 Georges Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images; Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art 
(Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press). 
26 Georges, Didi-Huberman, op. cit., at p268 
27 treated generally in the sixth meditation. 
28 Edgar Wind, Art and Anarchy (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1985). 
29 Edgar Wind, op. cit., p 31-32. 
30 Edgar Wind, op. cit., p 32 
depiction. Poussin might favour certain biblical themes, but so do countless others whose paintings might look 
as if they were painted by Poussin. Similarly, and more obviously, Rembrandt shares motifs with other 
painters from the ‘school of Rembrandt’. What then allows for a distinction to be drawn between a real and 
pretend Poussin, or Rembrandt? For Morelli, the ‘normal’ aesthetic reaction rather has to be suspended. The 
connoisseur has to step back from the painting’s overall depiction in order to hone in on the most telling of 
details, the signature, a brush stroke, a watermark. What might be considered insignificant or inessential, such 
as the watermark, thus becomes a loaded index of assigning meaning. As Wind asserts; “to identify the hand 
of the master, and distinguish it from the hand of a copyist, we must rely on small idiosyncrasies which seem 
inessential, subordinate features…: the shape of a finger nail or the lobe of an ear.”31.  
 
A century after Morelli’s work, it feels like small wonder, as Carlo Ginzburg notes, that his techniques 
influenced the technique of Freudian psychoanalysis. In his essay ‘The Moses of Michelangelo’ Freud 
explicitly acknowledges his debt to Morelli: “It seems to me that his [Morelli’s] method of inquiry is closely 
related to the technique of psycho-analysis. It, too, is accustomed to divine secret and concealed things from 
unconsidered or unnoticed details, from the rubbish heap, as it were, of our observations”32.  
 
Uncovering the specific skills of the analyst, or the connoisseur, who proceeds by analysing the symptom or 
watermark from within the patient or work, allows us to be a little more specific about the nature of those 
details that inhere in the image. What the connoisseur does in fetishizing the detail is to recognise that the 
detail bears characteristics radically distinct from those that philosophers, or indeed lawyers attribute to 
substance. They are rather incidents.  
 
From details to incidents 
In an essay that expands on the theme of random atomism inherent in language, Derrida muses on the 
character of the detective Dupin specifically as he is portrayed in ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue.33 Dupin, 
so Derrida stresses, is precisely the type of analyst for whom “all is symptom and diagnostics.”34 He 
“examines the countenance of his partner… [h]e notes every variation of face…gathering a fund of thought 
from the differences in expression.”35 For Derrida, such details, such clues, are more closely linked to a 
family of similar particles consisting of symptoms, accidents, and atoms. What establishes this family of 
particles is that they are incidental and accidental (both to the history of philosophy and to specific 
ontologies). Put in more straightforward philosophical terms, Derrida returns the incident to a position in 
which it has to be divorced from instance or substance. That is to say that the incidental has to be understood 
in a broader sense as that which may be deemed extraneous to the purported essence or meaning of an image 
or a statement. The colour, taste, smell and texture of an object are merely incidental. While they might 
‘cleave’ to a substance or a subject, they are simply ‘casual’36 effects and could be detached from an analysis 
of the essence of such things. Such incidentals may well attach to a substance, to a document, or to the oral 
performance of a witness, but they are in themselves non-essential qualities. They are separable and 
supplementary. A true analysis of an object, as judges would have it, would require details, incidents and 
                                                 
31 Edgar Wind, op. cit., p 36 
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36 The terms ‘casual’ and ‘cleave’ are often used by sixteenth and seventeenth century books of logic to 
describe the relationship between accident and substance. Thus, [An accident] is a voice or worde 
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9. Similarly; “An accident depends upon a substance for its existence. It is that which cleaveth to a 
substance.” Zachary Coke, The art of Logic 1654, p. 27.  
accidents to fall away from the gaze of inquiry. Indeed, the incident, Derrida reminds us, is what falls from the 
order of the world. Again, etymology refers us to a series of connections (or what Derrida claims to be 
fortuitous chances) relating to the fall. The words ‘accident’ ‘case’, ‘casual’, ‘occasion’, ‘occident’, 
‘deciduous’, ‘cadaver’ are all related to ‘incident’ through cadere, or kad (in centum languages). They all refer 
to a fall, or a lapse away from a system, a form, an order, the sky, a tree or life itself; they are all casualties of 
a post-lapsarian system of thought that celebrates verticality and hierarchy (or, a system of thought that 
attempts to repair Man’s fallen status). As Derrida puts it, the incident “affects the upward stance and vertical 
position by engraving in [the subject] the detour of a clinamen” (the clinamen refers to the Lucretian theory 
describing the swerving of atoms as they fall).37 Similarly, the incidental detail also shares the sense of fall 
with the word ‘symptom’ “a word meaning a sinking in or depression, a collapse but also a coin
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Derridas analysis of chance ought to read as part of his broader concern with the relationship between 
aleatorics and representation, or rather with the aleatoric rupture of representation.39 Such concern receives 
its most poetic and famous elaboration in The Post-Card40 according to which representation is structured 
like a postal network; that is, the relationship between signifier and signified is structured according to 
channels that might link transmission to reception. And like postal systems, like any transmission from 
sender to receiver, the destination (or, in metaphysical terms, ‘destiny’) of meaning is prone to ambush, 
delays and chance occurrences. Letters go astray. Failure is always possible. Incidents oc
a
 
It must be stressed here that Derrida is not concerned with the disorder of representation but rather with 
those hidden features that prevent closure of meaning from the outset. Where appellate decisions regarding 
the admissibility of images might be regarded as an attempt to control meaning, and to close meaning 
within coded convention, the incident introduces the fatal possibility of erring. The incidental detail always 
opens up the potential of swerving away from the proper juridically perceived destination of images. 
Incidental details that inhere in images such as watermarks thus belong to those other spatio-temporal 




It might also be noted, and indeed as Derrida himself points out, that the theme of the incidental detail is one 
that belongs to a repressed (or fallen/lapsarian) tradition that could be said to harbour this fallen collection of 
particles; “never forget that through-out the history of Occidental culture the Democritian tradition, in which 
the names of Epicurus and his disciples are recorded, has b
th
 
In other words, what renders the incidental detail so radical to methods of inquiry that stress objectivity and 
calculative rationality is precisely that they inhabit a register of what is potentially oblivious to
isrupting thought and visual analysis. As Bachelard puts it (in relation to the detail):  
Thought and Reality seem to come undone, and we might say that by distancing itself 
from the order of magnitude in which we think, Reality somehow loses its solidity, its 
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The effacement of the visual paradigm  
The authentication of any image, programme, text or document requires access to a hidden code, a 
supplementary detail, an incident. Security and copyright depends upon such devices. A form of disrupti
a
surface of a piece of work initially has to undergo a process of mutilation in order to make identity visible.  
 
Yet, this intial process of mutilation required in order to introject the watermark, is simply the initial 
trauma. However well concealed a device such as a watermark might be, it is its continual non-erasable 
presence within the work, its status as mere incident, that threatens to overwhelm the work itself and 
destabilize the Cartesian triumphal certitude of visual clarity on which the meaning of the whole work, 
rests. The watermark cannot easily be reconciled with the Cartesian suppositions. What is important to bear 
in mind is that the Democritian tradition that Derrida wishes to highlight theorises the miniscule detail as an 
incident, a symptom, which falls away from systems and code. In the case of watermarks, this incidentality 
arises from/falls away from exactly same surface as a theoretically whole object. Agai
d
viewing/reading that proceeds from the underside of the object, from its incidental signals. 
 
This practice entails the physical manipulation of the watermarked work. There is almost nothing to see and 
precisely because there is almost nothing to see the viewer has to suspend his normal aesthetic practice. 
Disguised, hidden, buried or introjected as if within an unconscious register, the watermark only emerges 
when the watermarked work is held up to the light and scanned. What is required of this visual practice is 
not so much Cartesian ocularism but rather Freudi
in
from the recesses of interiority to consciousness.  
 
It might be suggested that digital watermarks obviate the need for such physical manipulation. Digital 
signatures are often invisible. Yet in spite of their invisibility, these watermarks persist in presenting 
themselves as symptoms and incidents. And with more force. Subliminally or otherwise, there is always an 
awareness of the fact of copyright that inheres within a piece of work. There is always an awareness of the 
law operating upon consciousness or the unconscious of the ‘viewer’ as if the law were a watermark set 
within the interior domains of subjectivity. This persistence of such invisible, mysterious and uncoded 
messages as digital watermarks similarly disrupts visual practice. Conscious or unconscious reminders of 
another identity, they control the way we behave in front of the image. They provide a spatio-temporal set 
of incidents that manipulate the manner we approach the image. The viewer is no longer the superior ego 
affirmo of Cartesian subjectivity, but rather is passively manipulated by an anterior identity always present 
within the body of work. Merely incidental, watermarks continue the heretical function inaugurated by the 
pre-protestant sects. The economy of the watermark lies in the fact that in the war against images, 




43 Gaston Bachelard, ‘Essai sur la connaissance approchee’ p257 cited in Georges Didi-Huberman 
Confronting Images at p 234.  
44 Bayley, Lost Language, p361 
